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Abstract:  
This paper focuses on education and skills mismatch amongst Italian graduates. 
Indicators for over and under-utilisation of education and under-utilisation of skills 
are included in a grouped data lognormal wage equation, allowing us to test a number 
of theories which could explain the effect of over-schooling on wages. We find little 
evidence to support assignment theory and also identify a relatively weak wage effect 
arising from educational mismatch associated with the formal requirements of a job, 
when compared to that associated with an employee’s perception of the job 
requirements. Our interpretation is that employers may be mis-specifying jobs as 
‘graduate’ jobs in order to take advantage of an excess supply of graduates.  
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1. Introduction 
The impact of education-job mismatches on wages has been well documented in the 
economic literature (Cohn and Khan, 1995; Groot, 1996; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; 
Cohn and Chu Ng, 2000; Chu Ng, 2001). The emerging consensus is that job 
characteristics are a major determinant of earnings. Thus, a large number of studies 
find that individuals who occupy jobs which require a level of education lower than 
the level they have achieved (they are over-educated
1) earn less than individuals with 
the same educational attainment who work in jobs for which their level of 
qualification is appropriate. In contrast, the over-educated are likely to earn more than 
individuals in similar occupations who have a lower level of educational attainment 
which is more appropriate for the job.  
 
The importance of job characteristics is further underlined if one considers individuals 
whose level of education is lower than that required to carry out their job (they are 
under-educated). Findings from the research suggest that the under-educated have 
higher wages than those with the same level of educational attainment who are 
working in jobs for which their education is considered appropriate, but less than 
individuals working in an equivalent job with the higher level of education which is 
actually required.  
 
In this paper we focus our attention on graduate over-education in the Italian labour 
market. Perhaps as a result of limited data availability very little research has focused 
on the extent of Italian over-education. Nevertheless, statistics (ISTAT, 1997 and 
2000a) suggest that the incidence of over-education among Italian graduates has 
increased significantly over the second half of the 1990s
2. Given a variety of evidence 
(see, for instance, Checchi, 2000) that an Italian university education does not seem to 
enhance employment prospects as much as in other countries of the OECD, one may 
expect many graduates to be pushed into accepting non-graduate jobs. For instance, in 
1999 the unemployment rate among Italian individuals aged between 25 and 64 who 
possessed a tertiary school degree was 4.2 per cent for men and 7.6 for women, 
                                                 
1 The terms “over-educated’ and ‘over-qualified’ are used here interchangeably as well as “under-
educated” and “under-qualified”.  
2 The proportion of graduates working in jobs for which a university degree was not a formal 
requirement increased from 26.3 per cent to 31.5 per cent between 1995 and 1998.    3
whereas for the OECD as a whole, the average was only 3.1 per cent and 4.1 per cent 
respectively (OECD, 2001).  
 
Moreover, there is evidence that labour market prospects are particularly unfavourable 
for new graduates attempting to secure their first job. For instance, following 
graduation individuals spend an average of 19 months before finding their first job  - 
the corresponding figure for a recent secondary school graduate is 20 months 
(Sorcioni, 1999). This problem seems to persist for many years after graduation and 
only after reaching the age of 35 does a tertiary school degree holder face a lower risk 
of unemployment than those who hold only secondary or primary school 
qualifications (ISTAT, 2000b). 
 
In this paper we attempt to add to the expanding literature on over-education with a 
study of the effects of over-schooling on wages and on-the-job search in Italy. We 
present the results  of several specifications for our regression equations in an attempt 
to test the validity of various theories, which have been put forward to explain the 
wage effects of over-education  - including an analysis of the extent to which the 
impact of over-qualification reflects an under-utilisation of skills. We adopt a 
methodological approach similar to that used in related work by Allen and Van Der 
Velden, (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2002) on Dutch and English graduates 
respectively.  
 
The main difference i n approach concerns our indicators of over-education. Whilst 
previous work has tended to focus on a measure of over-qualification from either the 
employee or employer perspective, we are able to use both in our regression analysis. 
Thus we are able to identify whether a university degree was a ‘formal’ requirement 
for a given job (an indicator which we interpret as the employer’s ‘official’ view of 
the job requirements) and also whether the employee feels that their level of education 
is appropriate for actually ‘carrying out’ the job. In this way we are able to account for 
the possibility that employers are attempting to benefit from the increased supply of 
graduates by re-categorising jobs as requiring a degree, when both the education 
required and the wage scale associated with the job are clearly not graduate-level. 
   4
In addition to the various specifications for our wage equation we also attempt to 
identify the most important factors influencing a worker’s decision to search for a job 
better suited to their own capabilities. The rationale for this is that being over-
educated can be interpreted as a ‘transient state’, occupied by workers who are 
attempting to gain additional information on labour market opportunities and adjust 
their present position through additional job-search (Hartog, 2000). In Italy this 
situation may be exacerbated by the high costs of job search. As suggested by Faini et 
al. (1997), the inefficiency, which results from the virtual monopoly of public 
employment agencies, may add to the problems of mismatch.  
 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follow. Several explanations for the 
effects of over-education on wages are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 describes the 
data and variables used in the regression analysis. Some d escriptive statistics on the 
relation between over and under-qualification and over and under-utilisation of skills 
are provided in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results on the effects 
of educational and skill mismatches on wages and on-the-job search respectively. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives  
Four main theories have been advanced to explain the observed wage effects of over-
schooling. These are human capital theory, assignment theory, heterogeneous skill 
theory and institutional theory.  
 
Human capital theory  
 
Human capital theory suggests that individuals are paid the value of their marginal 
product
3, which in turn is determined by their human capital, rather than the 
characteristics of the job they occupy (Becker, 1975). According to human capital 
theory, individuals undertake investment in their human capital if the net present 
value of future incremental earnings accruing from the investment, outweigh the 
direct and opportunity costs. Thus the Mincerian earnings specification is as follows, 
 
ln w = a1 S
a + X a2 + e        (1) 
 
                                                 
3 Though they may be paid less than marginal product (MP) early in their career and higher than MP 
later on in life.   5
where S
a is the actual years of education attained, X is a vector of control variables 
and e is a random error term. 
 
It is assumed that firms are able to fully utilise the skills and the knowledge of their 
employees, and to be able to adapt their production technology in response to changes 
in the relative supply of skilled labour. Several economists, however, (Duncan and 
Hoffman, 1981; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Rumberger, 1987) have called these 
assumptions into question. First, institutional rigidities, such as restrictive working 
practices, may imply that firms neither fully utilise every individual’s education, nor 
pay every individual the value of their potential marginal product (Green et al., 1999). 
Second, the substantial increase in the supply of graduates over the last two decades 
may have seriously challenged the firms’ ability to adapt production techniques to 
utilise more skilled labour. If firms cannot adapt their production techniques in 
response to changes in skilled labour availability, and/or cannot fully use an 
individual’s education, then an individual’s productivity and hence his/her wage may 
crucially depend on the characteristics of their job.  
 
In the light of these considerations several researchers have split the schooling 
variable (S
a) into years of required education (S
r) and years of surplus (S
o), or deficit 
(S







u          (2) 
 
Thus the earnings specification is given by  
 
ln w = ß0 + ß1 S
r + ß2 S
o + ß3 S
u + X ß4 + e    (3) 
 
 
Estimation of the wage equation (3) allows researchers to study whether individuals’ 
earnings depend on both their level of human capital investment and the educational 
requirements of the job, or if productivity is solely dependent upon their human 
capital (ß1 =ß2 = ß3= a1) 
 
Assignment theory and heterogeneous skill theory 
 
In the literature, the view that workers’ earnings are determined by both the extent of 
human capital investment and job characteristics (required levels of education and   6
skills) is shared by two theories. These are the assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993) 
and the heterogeneous skill theory (Green and McIntosh, 2002). The difference 
between the two lies in the interpretation of the relationship between under- and over-
education (educational mismatch) and under- and over-utilisation of skills (skill 
mismatch).  
 
According to assignment theory, these concepts are closely related. Thus, workers 
report that their level of education is inappropriate for the job they occupy because of 
the poor match between the knowledge and the skills acquired during their years of 
study and those needed to actually carry out their job. Following from this one would 
expect workers whose level of education is higher than their job typically requires to 
be unable to fully utilise their skills. Hence, they are likely to be less productive than 
their peers with the same level of education who occupy jobs for which their own 
level of educational attainment is appropriate.  
 
Alternatively, the heterogeneous skills theory suggests that the link between 
educational and skill mismatch is much weaker. The basic assumption is that, even 
amongst individuals with the same level of schooling, there is significant variability i n 
terms of skill endowments and ability. Thus it is quite possible to find workers who 
appear to be over-educated but, because their level of skills and abilities are at the 
bottom of the range of people with similar qualifications, in terms of abilities a nd 
skills they may match more closely those with the appropriate (lower) level of 
education for the job they occupy. Accordingly, the reason why over-qualified 
workers are found to earn less than their peers with the same level of education who 
work in jobs for which their qualifications are appropriate, is because the former are 
either less able or have less marketable skills.  
 
To examine whether the effects of over and under-qualification reflect the limits 
placed on opportunities for skill utilisation,  as opposed to heterogeneity in the skill 
endowments of individuals within the same level of educational attainment, 
researchers (see, for instance, Allen and Van Der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 
2002) have included among the explanatory variables of t he wage equation, measures 
of both education and skills mismatch. Thus, if the coefficient on over-qualification is 
considerably reduced when one controls for the effect of under-utilisation of skills,   7
then the assignment theory would seem to be a more accurate explanation of any 
observed wage effects of educational mismatch. In contrast, if skill mismatches 
account for very little of the wage effects of educational mismatch, then heterogeneity 
of skills within bands of educational achievement would seem to present a more 
accurate explanation  – though it must be noted that this is a necessary rather than a 
sufficient condition for the acceptance of this theory. 
 
The assignment and heterogeneous skill theories are often tested using indicators of 
educational  mismatch, which are based on employees’ perceptions of the level of 
education required to  carry out their jobs. The rationale being that, only these self-
reported ‘subjective’ measures of educational mismatch can be reliably compared to 





Institutional theorists suggest that only job characteristics (required level of 
education) determine earnings (Thurow, 1975)
4. The rationale for this is that, as a 
result of the problems employers encounter when attempting to quantify individual 
productivity, job characteristics are often used by firms to make inferences over 
workers’ productivity and hence their wages. Thus, the formally required level of 
education for the job is frequently incorporated in wage scales, as determined in 
collective and individual bargaining agreements. In order to test this theory it is 
preferable to use measures of educational mismatch which reflect the level of 
education  formally  required to  obtain the job rather than the one considered by the 
employee to be the most appropriate to  carry out the job tasks. Whilst we would 
expect these two measures to be correlated, information asymmetries  – possibly 
arising from the employer’s limited understanding of the skills associated with various 
levels of educational attainment and the applicant’s lack of information on the true 
requirements of the job  – are likely to reduce the correspondence between formal 
requirements and employee perceptions. 
 
                                                 
4 In equation (3) b2=b3=0.   8
3. Data and Methodology 
The data are taken from a survey carried out by ISTAT (National Statistical Italian 
Centre) in 1998 on individuals who graduated from all Italian universities in 1995. 
The survey asks questions on previous educational attainment, degree results, 
employment status, parents’ socio-economic characteristics, as well as a variety of 
personal attributes. Using a sample frame of all individuals who graduated from 
Italian universities in 1995 (105,097), the target sample was fixed at 25,716 students. 
Of these, 64.7 per cent (17,326 individuals) responded to the questionnaire.  
 
Although the response rate is as one would expect for a postal survey, the data 
collected are unlikely to be fully representative of the Italian graduate p opulation. As 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) suggest, graduates who have moved house without 
leaving forwarding addresses will not receive the questionnaire and bias will arise if 
graduate mobility is none random. In addition, it is common for lower response to be 
associated with certain groups such as the unemployed (Shackleton and Urwin, 1999).  
 
Also, it should be mentioned that our data on after-tax wages are subject to two 
particular limitations. First, wages are recorded on a monthly, rather than an hourly 
basis and this forces us to restrict the sample under analysis to those graduates who 
are working full-time  - in an attempt to select a relatively homogeneous group of 
workers in terms of number of working hours. Furthermore, Robinson (2000) shows 
that,  since the returns to part-time work greatly differ from the returns to full-time 
work, it is not meaningful to pool full-time and part-time data together. Second, our 
data on wages are grouped into four broad categories (in thousands of Liras and with 
the proportion of graduates in brackets):  
 
0 < 1,500 (19.8%)    1,501-2,000 (40.9%)  
2,000-3,000 (33.8%)    > 3,000 (5.6%) 
 
Whilst the small number of wage categories may reflect the relatively narrow earnings 
distribution in Italy (see, for instance, Gottshalk  and Smeeding, 1997), we would 
ideally have a greater number of categories. To estimate the wage equation we use a 
grouped regression model and assume a parametric distribution (lognormal) for the 
error term. The assumption that the distribution of the error tem is lognormal has been   9
widely adopted in estimating equations using censored wage data (see, for instance, 
Addison and Portugal, 2002).  
 
Both our measures of educational mismatch are worker self-reported. However, as 
stated previously, we interpret t he first of these measures as representing the views of 
the employer. Thus, the first measure we use records the level of schooling  formally 
required for a particular job. Specifically, graduates were asked to respond to the 
question: “Was a university degree a formal requirement to obtain your current job?”. 
The second measure asks graduates to compare their level of education with the one 
they consider to be appropriate to  carry out  their job tasks. In this case, graduates 
were asked to respond to the question: “With respect to your current job, do you feel 
that having a university degree is excessive, adequate or insufficient?”.  
 
We then construct skill mismatch variables from the responses to a question that asks 
graduates to indicate, “the extent to which they have used the knowledge and the 
skills acquired at university in their current job”. Answers to this question are on a 
four-point scale, as follows: “a lot”, “quite a lot”, “a little” and “none”. Unfortunately, 
in contrast to the analyses carried  out by Allen and Van Der Velden, (2001) and 
Green and McIntosh (2002), it has not been possible to set up an indicator for skill 
deficit, as our survey does not include a question on this issue.  
 
Using the response to these three questions we create four dummy variables. The first 
one (EDMIS) takes a value of 1 if a university degree was not a formal requirement 
for the graduate’s current job, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the second dummy variable 
(OVERED) has a value of 1 if the worker considers their level of education to be 
excessive, relative to the job tasks they have to perform, and 0 otherwise. The third 
dummy variable (UNDERED) takes a value of 1 if a worker feels that their level of 
education is insufficient, relative to the job tasks. Finally, with respect to skill 
mismatch, we construct a dummy variable (SKIMIS) which takes the value 1 if 
graduates respond that they have used either “none” or “a little” of the knowledge and 
skills acquired at university in their current jobs, and 0 otherwise.  
 
In  addition to the measures of educational and skills mismatch, our wage specification 
comprises a large number of control variables including age, sex, nationality, 
existence of dependents, whether individuals are married or cohabiting, social class,   10
subject of study, degree classification, firm size, industry, postgraduate qualifications, 
tenure, experience, geographical area, amount of time spent on-the-job training and 
occupation. A description of the variables and summary statistics can be found in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
*Insert Tables 1 and 2 Near Here* 
 
 
4. Education and Skills Mismatch 
In our sample the proportion of graduates who claimed that their employer required 
them to have a university degree to obtain their job is 68.5 per cent whilst the 
proportion of those who stated that a university degree was needed to actually carry 
out the job tasks is slightly higher at 69.8 per cent.  
 
In addition, the proportion of Italian graduates who stated using “none” or “a little” of 
the skills and knowledge acquired at university in their current job is very high (41.8 
per cent). This may be a consequence of the Italian university system’s focus on 
imparting theoretical knowledge to students, as opposed to on-the-job training or 
work experience (Groot, 1993). Accordingly, this outcome may be interpreted as the 
result of a mismatch between the skills imparted by tertiary education and the skills 
required by firms. 
 
Table 3 shows the relation between the educational mismatch measure based on the 
jobholder’s v iew of the education needed to carry out the job and the indicator for 
skill under-utilisation. As can be seen, 72.77 per cent of graduates who considered 
their level of education to be adequate for the job, report using “quite a lot” or “a lot” 
of the knowledge and skills learnt at university. Similarly, 80.32 per cent of graduates 
working in jobs for which they felt having a university degree was excessive, claimed 
using “none” or “a little” of the skills and the knowledge acquired at university. Thus, 
whilst there is a relatively strong positive correlation between educational and skill 
mismatches, the former is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the latter.  
 
*Insert Table 3 Near Here* 
This result is consistent with the analyses carried o ut by Allen and Van Der Velden 
(2001) on Dutch graduates and by Green and McIntosh (2002) on UK graduates. 
Thus, approximately 19.64 per cent of graduates occupying jobs for which they   11
considered their level of education to be excessive, claimed using “quite a lot” or “a 
lot” of the knowledge and the skills acquired at university in their current job. Further 
analysis of this sub-group of workers reveals that approximately 60 per cent of them 
had an intermediate occupation (e.g. technicians, nurses, office  managers). Whilst it 
would seem that having a degree is considered excessive for this type of occupation, 
there would seem to be scope for the use of skills and knowledge acquired.  
 
More importantly, we find that 27.22 per cent of those graduates who considered their 
level of education to be appropriate for the job, report severe skill under-utilisation. A 
possible explanation is that a university education imparts skills that are only 
indirectly related to their future job tasks (i.e. the more ‘general’ a nd ‘transferable’ 
skills). Thus, the knowledge and skills acquired at university will enable graduates to 
learn easily and quickly those techniques and processes that are specifically required 
to perform their job tasks.  
 
5. The Impact of Mismatch on Wages 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of the effects of education and skills mismatch on earnings. 
The first column gives the results of a specification (specification 1) that includes 
indicators for human capital (i.e. postgraduate qualifications, time spent-on-the-job 
training, labour market experience) together with all the control variables mentioned 
in Section 3. The empirical results are consistent with previous research, with the 
exception of the coefficient on postgraduate qualifications, which is positive  as 
expected, but not statistically significant.  
 
*Insert Table 4 Near Here* 
 
Thus, undertaking on-the-job training, having labour market experience before the 
start of the current job and having tenure in the current job result in a higher wage. 
The pattern of industry, geographical location, social class, occupation and subject of 
study differentials are also as one would expect. As regards degree classification, 
those individuals who have achieved the highest level of educational attainment (110 
summa cum laude) at university are found to earn approximately 2 per cent more than 
their peers whose grade was between 105 and 110. In line with the results obtained by 
Pistaferri (1999), the size of a firm is found to exert a significant influence on 
earnings in Italy.     12
The results of specification 2, presented in the second column of Table 4, include the 
educational mismatch variables based on an employees’ judgment of the level of 
education required to carry out the job. As expected, the coefficient on over-education 
is found to be negative and statistically significant, whereas that on under-education is 
neither in line with expectations nor statistically significant. The results indicate that 
over-qualified graduate workers earn, on average, 5.1 per cent less than those with the 
same qualification level who occupy jobs for which they are adequately qualified. 
This seems quite low, but one should bear in mind that Dolton and Silles (2001) find 
that the wage penalty associated with over-educated graduate workers is lower in their 
first employment destination than in the later stages of their career. Furthermore, one 
may note that the inclusion of these educational mismatch variables has improved the 
fit of the model.  
 
In specification 3 we utilise an indicator o f skill mismatch instead of the educational 
mismatch variables in an attempt to explain wage differences. The results are 
presented in the third column of Table 4. As expected, skill under-utilisation is found 
to have a negative impact on earnings. According to our findings, the wage penalty 
for those graduates who reported using “none” or “a little” of the skills and 
knowledge learnt at university in their current job is about 1.5 per cent.  In addition, it 
is interesting to note that specification 3 accounts for less of the variation in wages 
than specification 2.  
 
In specification 4, whose results are depicted in the fourth column of Table 4, the 
previously employed indicators for education and skills mismatch are combined. 
While the effect of under-utilisation of skills on wages disappears when controlling 
for educational mismatches, the impact of over-qualification on earnings is virtually 
unaffected by the inclusion of the skill mismatch measure. More specifically, the 
value of the coefficient on over-education is largely unchanged relative to the one 
obtained in specification 2, whereas the estimated value of the indicator for skill 
under-utilisation is statistically insignificant and its sign is not in line with 
expectations.  
 
These empirical results question the strength of assignment theory as an explanation 
of the wage effects arising from over-education. Thus, an examination of the 
measures of fit associated with each specification shows that, in specification 4, the   13
value of the likelihood ratio  index is only slightly higher than that in specification 2, 
which in turn, is considerably higher than that associated with specification 3. 
However, it should be noted that, whilst the findings are more consistent with the 
heterogeneous skills theory, they do not provide incontrovertible evidence  – the 
rejection of assignment theory is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
validity of heterogeneous skills theory.  
 
In specification 5 we add (to specification 1) an indicator for educational mismatch 
constructed using the level of education formally required to obtain the job. The 
results are reported in the fifth column of Table 4. The findings indicate that graduates 
working in jobs for which a university degree was not formally required, receive 
lower wages than other graduates who occupy jobs for which a degree was a formal 
requirement. More specifically the odds ratio associated with this measure is 0.964, 
implying a wage penalty of 3.6% for graduates working in a job for which a 
university degree was not formally required.  
 
Thus, it would seem that the relative earnings disadvantage associated with over-
education is higher in specification 2 than in specification 5. At first this may seem to 
be somewhat counter-intuitive, as it suggests that the employee’s view of the job 
requirements are more important in determining wages than the formal requirements 
of the employer. However, as noted previously, it is possible that a number of 
employers have taken advantage of the over-supply of graduates  by re-designating 
some non-graduate jobs (especially those at the margin between non-graduate and 
graduate jobs) as formally requiring a university degree. Assuming that these 
employers have failed to adjust the corresponding wage scale associated with newly 
designated ‘graduate’ jobs, we would expect a lowering of the earnings differential 
between those jobs which are formally designated as graduate and non-graduate.  
 
The low value of the coefficient on our indicator of educational mismatch  - based on 
the formally required level of education  - may then be interpreted as reflecting this 
situation, as one would expect the views of workers who have been in their job for 
some time to better reflect the actual level of education needed to carry out the job. 
Thus, the coefficient on our indicator of the jobholder’s perception of educational 
requirements could be acting as a signal, identifying those jobs which have been mis-
specified as ‘graduate’ (due to employer opportunism) but do not actually have pay   14
scales  in place which reward graduate skills  – the pay scale is one which we would 
associate with a non-graduate job. 
 
6. Mismatch and On-The-Job Search 
In this section of the paper we examine the extent to which education and skills 
mismatches constitute a motivation for individuals to look for another job. In order to 
carry out this analysis we run a binomial logistic regression with the dichotomous 
dependent variable recording whether graduate workers are seeking alternative 
employment. In addition to the control variables included in the previous model, we 
also introduce wage dummies as possible explanatory factors.  
 
*Insert Table 5 Near Here* 
 
The empirical findings of the basic specification (specification 1) are depicted in the 
first column of Table 5. These indicate that occupation, social class and industry 
dummies affect the probability that graduates will search for another job. As expected, 
earnings are found to be a strong predictor of the probability of looking for another 
job. More specifically, a low wage is a strong incentive for graduates to seek 
alternative employment.  
 
In specification 2, whose results are shown in the second column of Table 5, we add 
to specification 1 the two indicators for educational mismatch reflecting the 
jobholder’s view  of the appropriate level of education needed to carry out the job. The 
coefficient on over-education is statistically significant and its sign is as expected. 
Thus, graduate workers who consider their level of education to be excessive, relative 
to the job tasks they have to perform, are 2.89 times more likely to look for another 
job relative to their peers who feel their own level of education is appropriate for their 
job. Furthermore, the inclusion of the educational mismatch measure has significantly 
improved the fit of the regression.  
 
For specification 3, the results of which are presented in the third column of Table 5, 
we remove the educational mismatch variables and introduce a measure of skill 
under-utilisation. The estimated coefficient on the measure of skill under-utilisation is 
statistically significant and has the expected sign. Nevertheless, from the estimates of 
specifications 2 and 3 it emerges that over-qualification is a stronger predictor of   15
seeking alternative employment than skill under-utilisation. In line with this, one may 
also note that the measure of the fit is higher in specification 2 than in specification 3. 
 
In specification 4, whose results are shown in the fourth column of Table 5, we 
include both the aforementioned education  and skills mismatch measures. Although 
the associated marginal effects are lower than those for specifications 2 and 3, the 
empirical findings are consistent with the view that over-qualification exerts a 
stronger influence on the probability of looking for another job relative to skill under-
utilisation. This result is not in line with that obtained by Allen and Van Der Velden 
(2001) who find that, in the Netherlands, skills mismatch is a stronger determinant of 
the probability of looking for alternative e mployment relative to education mismatch. 
Thus, it would seem that over-qualification is a greater cause of dissatisfaction 
amongst Italian graduates than skill under-utilisation.  
 
A possible reason for this lies in the graduates’ perception of their relative position 
within the labour market. Since skill under-utilisation is more widespread amongst 
Italian graduates, when compared to the extent of over-education, those who report 
that they are over-skilled may not perceive their position within the labour market to 
be particularly unfavourable. Thus, they are unlikely to consider the possibility of 
changing jobs, as there is a high probability that they will once again end up in a job 
which under-utilises the knowledge and skills acquired at university. In contrast, since 
being over-educated is less common than being over-skilled, graduates may be less 
willing to tolerate the former, considering the probability of a better match to be 
sufficiently high to justify searching for an alternative job. 
 
In specification 5 (fifth column of Table 5) we add an educational mismatch measure 
based on the level of education formally required to obtain the graduate’s present job. 
Again the coefficient on this indicator is statistically significant and its sign is as 
expected. Unsurprisingly, the odds ratio associated with this measure is found to be 
significantly lower than the one related to the indicator for educational mismatch 
which reflects the jobholder’s view about the level of education appropriate for the 
job. Clearly, the latter, being based on the employee’s perception, is more likely to 
have behavioural consequences than the former, which mirrors the employer’s view.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed the effect of over-schooling on earnings and on on-the-job 
search among Italian graduates. In line with previous work, we find that graduates 
whose level of education exceeds the adequate or formally required level of education 
for their job, receive lower wages than their peers with similar level of schooling in 
jobs for which they are suitably qualified.   
 
We reject the hypothesis that productivity is solely dependent upon the characteristics 
of the individual (specifically the level of human capital) and also the contention that 
productivity is entirely job specific (as assumed by institutional theorists). Our 
empirical results are more ‘consistent’ with the heterogeneous skills theory as an 
explanation of the observed effects of over-education on earnings, though we do not 
believe that the findings are sufficient to justify un-reserved acceptance of this theory. 
Thus, we identify a wage penalty associated with being over-educated which is not 
reduced once we control for possible over-skilling. This suggests that the underlying 
reason why over-qualified graduates earn less than correctly allocated graduate 
workers is not skill under-utilisation  – a finding that questions the explanatory power 
of the assignment theory.  
 
In addition, we suggest that our results support the view that employee perceptions of 
the educational requirements of a particular job are more reliable indicators of the true 
nature of the job (and therefore the associated pecuniary returns), when compared to 
the formal educational requirements as set out by the employer. This result would 
seem to be consistent with a phenomenon of increasing graduate numbers, which 
leads to a relative over-supply of graduates (relative to the supply of non-graduates). 
In this situation, employers may be tempted to take advantage of such an over-supply 
and artificially raise the formal educational requirement for a range of jobs, which 
have traditionally been held by non-graduates. However, these newly specified jobs 
are likely to have pay scales that continue to reflect the true ‘non-graduate’ nature of 
the job tasks. This has the effect of reducing the  average earnings differential 
between jobs that are more formally categorised as graduate and non-graduate. In this 
instance, those workers who register that their level of education is excessive for their 
present job are signalling that their present employment is incorrectly designated as 
‘graduate’ and that the accompanying wage scale is also non-graduate.     17
 
Finally, with reference to our regression equation which models job-search behaviour, 
we would conclude that over-education is a stronger predictor of the probability that 
Italian graduates will seek alternative employment, when compared to skill under-
utilisation. This result, which runs counter to those obtained from previous research 
analysing Dutch graduates, could be ascribed to Italian graduate perceptions over the 
relative status associated with being either over-skilled or over-educated. Since in 
Italy the former is significantly more frequent than the latter, many graduates may be 
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 Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variable    Definition 
POSTQUAL  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has a higher degree or other postgraduate qualification and 0 
otherwise. 
EXP  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has experience before his/her current job and 0 otherwise. 
TENURE  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has tenure in his/her current job and 0 otherwise. 
MALE  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s sex is male and 0 otherwise. 
CHILD  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has at least one child and 0 otherwise. 
MARCOHA  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is married or cohabiting and 0 otherwise. 
OVERED  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate feels his/her level of education to be excessive relative to the 
job he/she is doing and 0 otherwise. 
UNDERED  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate feels his/her level of education to be insufficient relative to 
the job he/she is doing and 0 otherwise. 
EDMIS  Dummy variable: 1 if university degree was not formally required to obtain the job the graduate 
is doing and 0 otherwise. 
SKIMIS  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate uses “none” or  “a little” of the skills and knowledge 
acquired at university in his/her current job and 0 otherwise. 
ECON  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is Economics or Agricultural studies and 0 
otherwise. 
LAW  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is Law and 0 otherwise. 
POLSC  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is Political Science and 0 otherwise. 
MEDIC  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is Medicine and 0 otherwise. 
SCIENCE  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is physics, maths, chemistry, biology or 
pharmacy and 0 otherwise. 
ENGTECH  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is architecture or engineering and 0 
otherwise. 
ARTS  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s subject of study is literature, languages, psychology or 
education and 0 otherwise. 
CONSTRU  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in the construction industry and 0 otherwise.  
WHOLES  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in the wholesale, retail, restaurant or associated 
trades and 0 otherwise.  
FINANCE  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in the finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services sector and 0 otherwise. 
TRANSP  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in the transportation, storage and 
communication industries and 0 otherwise. 
MANUF  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in manufacturing and 0 otherwise. 
AGRIC  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate i s employed in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
industries and 0 otherwise. 
PUBAD  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is employed in public administration and defence, education, 
health and social work, other community, social and personal, or extra-territorial organisations 
and bodies. 
NOEAST  Dummy variable: 1 if the geographical location of the university attended by the graduate is 
Northeast and 0 otherwise. 
CENTRE  Dummy variable: 1 if the geographical location of the university attended by the graduate is 
Centre and 0 otherwise. 
AREAUNK  Dummy variable: 1 if the geographical location of the university attended by the graduate is 
unknown and 0 otherwise. 
NOWEST  Dummy variable: 1 if the geographical location of the university attended by the graduate is 
Northwest and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  Dummy variable: 1 if the geographical location of the university attended by the graduate is 
South and 0 otherwise. 
SOCLA1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s father is a manager, high level public servant, 
entrepreneur, intellectual or has a scientific and highly specialised occupation and 0 otherwise. 
SOCLA2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s father has an intermediate occupation (technician), a 
middle-management occupation, an occupation related to sales and personnel services or is a 
policeman or a soldier and 0 otherwise. 
SOCLA3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s father is a craftsman, farmer, a plant and machine 
operative or has a non-specialist occupation and 0 otherwise. 
SOCLA4  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s father’s occupation is unknown and 0 otherwise.  
 FIRMSIZE1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate works in a firm with between 1 and 5 employees and 0 
otherwise. 
FIRMSIZE2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate works in a firm with between 6 and 49 employees and 0 
otherwise. 
FIRMSIZE3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate works in a firm with between 50 and 99 employees and 0 
otherwise. 
FIRMSIZE4  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate works in a firm with more than 100 employees and 0 
otherwise. 
FIRMSIZE5  Dummy variable: 1 if the number of employees working in the same firm of the graduate is 
unknown and 0 otherwise. 
PROF1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is a manager, high level public servant, entrepreneur, 
intellectual or has a scientific and highly specialised occupation and 0 otherwise. 
PROF2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has an intermediate occupation (technician), a middle-
management occupation, an occupation related to sales and personnel services or is a policeman 
or a soldier and 0 otherwise. 
PROF3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is a craftsman, farmer, a plant and machine operative, or has 
a non-specialist occupation, or his/her occupation is unknown and 0 otherwise. 
ONJTR1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has spent no time on-the-job training and 0 otherwise. 
ONJTR2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has spent one week or less on-the-job training and 0 
otherwise. 
ONJTR3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate has spent more than one week on-the-job training and 0 
otherwise. 
DEGR1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s university degree classification is between 70 and 89.99 
and 0 otherwise. 
DEGR2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s university degree classification is between 90 and 99 and 0 
otherwise. 
DEGR3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s university degree classification is between 100 and 104.99 
and 0 otherwise. 
DEGR4  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s university degree classification is between 105 and 110 
and 0 otherwise. 
DEGR5  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s university degree classification is 110 summa cum laude 
and 0 otherwise. 
AGE1  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s age is between 24 and 25 and 0 otherwise. 
AGE2  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s age is between 26 and 27 and 0 otherwise. 
AGE3  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s age is between 28 and 29 and 0 otherwise. 
AGE4  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s age is 30 or more 0 otherwise. 
AGE5  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate’s age is unknown and 0 otherwise. 
ITAL  Dummy variable: 1 if the graduate is Italian and 0 otherwise. 
WAGE  Categorical variable (taking a value between 1 and 4 inclusively) indicating the after-tax wage 

















 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

























































WAGE 2.251 0.8335Table 3: The Relation between over/under –education and  
a measure of skill under-utilisation 
 
Under and over 
education based on 
job holder’s view 
Extent to which graduates have used the knowledge and skills 
acquired at university in their current job 
 
  “Quite a lot”/” A lot”  “None/ A little”  Total 
Over-educated  375  1,531  1,906 
Adequately educated  3,801  1,422  5,223 
Under-educated  180  175  355 
Total  4,356  3,128  7,484 
 
 
 Table 4:  Wage equation, grouped regression, log-normal: marginal effects (standard errors in parentheses)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Constant 14.401 (0.259)* 14.42 (0.026)* 14.409 (0.026)* 14.42 (0.026)* 14.416 (0.026)*
MALE 0.067 (0.007)* 0.066 (0.007)* 0.067 (0.007)* 0.066 (0.007)* 0.066 (0.007)*
MARCOHA 0.02 (0.007)* 0.019 (0.007)* 0.019 (0.007)* 0.019 (0.007)* 0.021 (0.007)*
CHILD 0.029 (0.016)** 0.03 (0.016)** 0.03 (0.016)** 0.029 (0.016)** 0.031 (0.016)*
ITAL -0.01 (0.022) -0.011 (0.022) -0.01 (0.022) -0.011 (0.022) -0.009 (0.022)
Age- Reference group is AGE1
AGE2 -0.012 (0.008) -0.01 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) -0.01 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008)
AGE3 -0.004 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01)
AGE4 -0.012 (0.013) -0.011 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) -0.011 (0.013) -0.01 (0.013)
AGE5 -0.023 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)* -0.022 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)*
POSTQUAL 0.012 (0.011) 0.012 (0.011) 0.012 (0.011) 0.012 (0.011) 0.0105 (0.011)
EXP 0.028 (0.006)* 0.027 (0.006)* 0.028 (0.006)* 0.027 (0.006)* 0.028 (0.006)*
TENURE 0.112 (0.007)* 0.112 (0.07)* 0.112 (0.007)* 0.112 (0.007)* 0.111 (0.007)*
Amount of time spent on-the-job training- Reference group is ONJTR2
ONJTR2 0.046 (0.009)* 0.045 (0.009)* 0.046 (0.009)* 0.045 (0.009)* 0.045 (0.009)*
ONJTR3 0.057 (0.007)* 0.054 (0.007)* 0.056 (0.007)* 0.054 (0.007)* 0.054 (0.007)*
Social class- Reference group is SOCLA2
SOCLA1 0.021 (0.007)* 0.02 (0.007)* 0.021 (0.007)* 0.02 (0.007)* 0.021 (0.007)*
SOCLA3 -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008)
SOCLA4 0.047 (0.014)* 0.047 (0.014)* 0.047 (0.014)* 0.047 (0.014)* 0.047 (0.014)*
Subject of study- Reference group is ECON
SCIENCE -0.004 (0.009) -0.001 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01)
MEDIC 0.077 (0.017)* 0.075 (0.017)* 0.077 (0.017)* 0.075 (0.017)* 0.072 (0.017)*
ENGTECH 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.01 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009)
POLSC -0.036 (0.015)* -0.032 (0.015)* -0.033 (0.015)* -0.032 (0.015)* -0.029 (0.015)*
LAW -0.116 (0.013)* -0.114 (0.013)* -0.115 (0.013)* -0.114 (0.013)* -0.115 (0.013)*
ARTS -0.092 (0.012)* -0.085 (0.012)* -0.09 (0.012)* -0.085 (0.012)* -0.082 (0.012)*
Industry- Reference group is FINANCE
AGRIC -0.047 (0.026)** -0.044 (0.026)** -0.049 (0.026)** -0.044 (0.026)** -0.048 (0.026)**
MANUF 0.066 (0.01)* 0.066 (0.01)* 0.066 (0.01)* 0.066 (0.01)* 0.063 (0.01)*
COSNTRU 0.05 (0.011)* 0.05 (0.011)* 0.05 (0.011)* 0.05 (0.011)* 0.049 (0.011)*
WHOLES 0.006 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015) 0.007 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015) 0.01 (0.015)
TRANSP 0.043 (0.016)* 0.048 (0.016)* 0.044 (0.016)* 0.048 (0.016)* 0.044 (0.016)*
PUBAD 0.01 (0.009) 0.007 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01)
Firm Size- Reference group is FIRMSIZE4
FIRMSIZE1 -0.174 (0.01)* -0.177 (0.01)* -0.175 (0.01)* -0.177 (0.01)* -0.173 (0.01)*
FIRMSIZE2 -0.095 (0.008)* -0.095 (0.008)* -0.095 (0.008)* -0.095 (0.008)* -0.093 (0.008)*
FIRMSIZE3 -0.063 (0.012)* -0.063 (0.012)* -0.064 (0.012)* -0.063 (0.012)* -0.062 (0.012)*
FIRMSIZE5 -0.01 (0.013) -0.06 (0.013) -0.01 (0.013) -0.06 (0.013) -0.07 (0.013)
Degree Classification- Reference group is DEGR4
DEGR1 -0.003 (0.017) -0.002 (0.017) -0.003 (0.017) -0.002 (0.017) -0.001 (0.017)
DEGR2 -0.009 (0.009) -0.009 (0.008) -0.009 (0.009) -0.009 (0.009) -0.007 (0.009)
DEGR3 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.008) 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.008) 0.004 (0.008)
DEGR5 0.022 (0.008)* 0.021 (0.008)* 0.022 (0.008)* 0.022 (0.008)* 0.022 (0.008)*
Geographical location of the university attended by the graduate- Reference group is NOWEST
NOEAST -0.022 (0.008)* -0.02 (0.008)* -0.021 (0.008)* -0.02 (0.008)* -0.019 (0.008)*
CENTRE -0.033 (0.009)* -0.031 (0.009)* -0.032 (0.009)* -0.031 (0.009)* -0.032 (0.009)*
SOUTH -0.089 (0.01)* -0.089 (0.01)* -0.089 (0.01)* -0.089 (0.01)* -0.087 (0.01)*
AREAUNK -0.032 (0.013)* -0.029 (0.013)* -0.032 (0.013)* -0.029 (0.013)* -0.031 (0.013)*
Occupation- Reference group is PROF2
PROF1 0.035 (0.007)* 0.022 (0.007)* 0.032 (0.007)* 0.022 (0.007)* 0.023 (0.007)*
PROF3 -0.077 (0.021)* -0.073 (0.02)* -0.075 (0.021)* -0.074 (0.02)* -0.077 (0.02)*
Education job-match
OVERED -0.052 (0.007)* -0.055 (0.008)*
UNDERED -0.007 (0.014) -0.008 (0.014)
EDMIS -0.037 (0.007)*
Skill-job match
SKIMIS -0.015 (0.006)* 0.004 (0.007)
Number of observations 7,484 7,484 7,484 7,484 7,484
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.12089 0.12360 0.12118 0.12362 0.12222
* denotes significance at five per cent level
** denotes significance at ten per cent levelTable 5:  Marginal Effects for Binomial Logistic Regression  - Estimation for the Probability of 'Seeking Employment' 
Compared to the Reference Category of 'Not Seeking Employment' (standard errors in parentheses)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Constant -0.256 (0.211) -0.724 (0.218)* -0.697 (0.216)* -0.904 (0.220)* -0.371 (0.213)**
MALE -0.160 (0.057)* -0.150 (0.058)* -0.166(0.058)* -0.156 (0.058)* -0.156 (0.057)*
MARCOHA -0.082 (0.058) -0.077 (0.059) -0.073 (0.059) -0.073 (0.060) -0.091 (0.058)
CHILD 0.025 (0.134) 0.015 (0.137) 0.004 (0.137) 0.004 (0.138) 0.013 (0.134)
ITAL -0.019 (0.180) 0.029 (0.184) 0.014 (0.183) 0.037 (0.185) -0.025 (0.180)
Age- Reference group is AGE1
AGE2 0.041 (0.065) 0.018 (0.066) 0.026 (0.066) 0.013 (0.067) 0.034 (0.065)
AGE3 0.097 (0.085) 0.051 (0.087) 0.075 (0.086) 0.047 (0.088) 0.087 (0.085)
AGE4 0.265 (0.103)* 0.237 (0.105)* 0.261 (0.104)* 0.242 (0.106)* 0.250 (0.103)*
AGE5 0.114 (0.080) 0.071 (0.002) 0.091 (0.081) 0.066 (0.082) 0.098 (0.080)
POSTQUAL 0.287 (0.089)* 0.301 (0.091)* 0.297 (0.091)* 0.306 (0.092)* 0.301 (0.090)*
EXP -0.041 (0.051) -0.025 (0.059) -0.018 (0.052) -0.013 (0.053) -0.040 (0.051)
TENURE -0.232 (0.058)* -0.256 (0.059)* -0.248 (0.059)* -0.262 (0.060)* -0.233 (0.058)*
Amount of time spent on-the-job training- Reference group is ONJTR2
ONJTR2 0.006 (0.071) -0.028 (0.072) 0.018 (0.071) 0.031 (0.072) 0.014 (0.071)
ONJTR3 -0.276 (0.061)* -0.239 (0.062)* -0.277 (0.062)* -0.249 (0.063)* -0.267 (0.061)*
Social class- Reference group is SOCLA2
SOCLA1 -0.141 (0.06)* -0.129 (0.061)* -0.146 (0.061)* -0.135 (0.061)* -0.140 (0.06)*
SOCLA3 0.136 (0.064)* 0.127 (0.066)* 0.118 (0.065)** 0.116 (0.066)** 0.130 (0.064)*
SOCLA4 -0.253 (0.116)* -0.285 (0.119)* -0.268 (0.118)* -0.289 (0.120)* -0.254 (0.116)*
Subject of study- Reference group is ECON
SCIENCE 0.128 (0.079) 0.066 (0.081) 0.005 (0.081) -0.003 (0.082) 0.128 (0.080)
MEDIC -1.022 (0.170)* -0.996(0.171)* -1.084 (0.173)* -1.044 (0.173)* -0.985 (0.170)*
ENGTECH 0.051 (0.076) 0.059 (0.077) 0.020 (0.077) 0.034 (0.078) 0.087 (0.076)
POLSC 0.344 (0.118)* 0.281 (0.12)* 0.189 (0.121) 0.190 (0.123) 0.299 (0.119)*
LAW -0.112 (0.103) -0.128 (0.105) -0.116 (0.104) -0.128 (0.106) -0.113 (0.104)
ARTS 0.011 (0.094) -0.136 (0.096) -0.129 (0.096) -0.196 (0.097)* -0.057 (0.095)
Industry- Reference group is FINANCE
AGRIC 0.645 (0.207)* 0.628 (0.212)* 0.755 (0.21)* 0.706 (0.212)* 0.654 (0.207)*
MANUF 0.356 (0.078)* 0.377 (0.081)* 0.391 (0.081)* 0.397 (0.082)* 0.376 (0.080)*
COSNTRU 0.224 (0.093)* 0.221 (0.094)* 0.235 (0.095)* 0.230 (0.096)* 0.229 (0.093)*
WHOLES 0.565 (0.115)* 0.450 (0.119)* 0.495 (0.118)* 0.431 (0.120)* 0.534 (0.116)*
TRANSP 0.108 (0.136) -0.010 (0.14) 0.053 (0.137) -0.016 (0.141) 0.095 (0.136)
PUBAD 0.252 (0.079)* 0.335 (0.08)* 0.321 (0.081)* 0.362 (0.081)* 0.269 (0.079)*
Firm Size- Reference group is FIRMSIZE4
FIRMSIZE1 -0.459 (0.085)* -0.402 (0.122)* -0.415 (0.086)* -0.341 (0.123)* -0.462 (0.085)*
FIRMSIZE2 0.113 (0.112)** 0.132 (0.111)** 0.150 (0.113)* 0.11 (0.114) 0.103 (0.069)
FIRMSIZE3 -0.070 (0.134) -0.074 (0.102) -0.036 (0.101) -0.122 (0.137) -0.082 (0.1)
FIRMSIZE5 0.168 (0.107) -0.107 (0.110) 0.161 (0.110) -0.125 (0.11) 0.145 (0.108)
Degree Classification- Reference group is DEGR4
DEGR1 -0.004 (0.141) -0.023 (0.145) -0.010 (0.143) -0.023 (0.146) -0.016 (0.142)
DEGR2 0.044 (0.073) 0.044 (0.072) 0.027 (0.075) 0.032 (0.075) 0.030 (0.073)
DEGR3 0.079 (0.070) 0.076 (0.071) 0.081 (0.071) 0.077 (0.072) 0.077 (0.070)
DEGR5 -0.073 (0.070) -0.054 (0.071) -0.060 (0.071) -0.049 (0.072) -0.068 (0.070)
Geographical location of the university attended by the graduate- Reference group is NOWEST
NOEAST -0.046 (0.067) -0.085 (0.068) -0.070 (0.068) -0.092 (0.069) -0.064 (0.067)
CENTRE 0.206 (0.075)* 0.184 (0.077)* 0.177 (0.077)* 0.167 (0.078)* 0.202 (0.076)*
SOUTH 0.397 (0.080)* 0.417 (0.081)* 0.414 (0.081)* 0.424 (0.082)* 0.393 (0.080)*
AREAUNK 0.349 (0.107)* 0.307 (0.110)* 0.366 (0.109)* 0.330 (0.111)* 0.346 (0.107)*
Occupation- Reference group is PROF2
PROF1 -0.392 (0.058)* -0.143 (0.061)* -0.246 (0.060)* -0.105 (0.062)* -0.308 (0.061)*
PROF3 0.356 (0.161)* 0.321 (0.167)* 0.279 (0.165)** 0.278 (0.168)* 0.359 (0.162)*
Education job-match
OVERED 1.064 (0.062)* 0.794 (0.067)**
UNDERED 0.364 (0.118)* 0.231 (0.120)**
EDMIS 0.267 (0.061)*
Skill-job match
SKIMIS 0.851 (0.052)* 0.584 (0.058)*
Wage- Reference group is between 1,501 - 2,000 thousands of Liras
< 1,500 thousands of Liras 0.323 (0.074)* 0.338 (0.076)* 0.352 (0.076)* 0.355 (0.077)* 0.331 (0.075)*
2,000 - 3,000  thousands of Liras -0.314 (0.061)* -0.231 (0.063)* -0.287 (0.062)* -0.233 (0.063)* -0.285 (0.062)*
>3,000  thousands of Liras -0.820 (0.133)* -0.698 (0.134)* -0.793 (0.135)* -0.704 (0.135)* -0.807 (0.133)*
Number of observations 7,484 7,484 7,484 7,484 7,484
(-)2 Log Likelihood    9414.598 9107.59 9146.683 9005.291 9395.759
Nagelkerke - R^2    0.104 0.154 0.148 0.171 0.107
* denotes significance at five per cent
** denotes significance at ten per cent